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Abstract For some decades, the concept of human
dignity has been widely discussed in bioethical litera-
ture. Some authors think that this concept is central to
questions of respect for human beings, whereas others
are very critical of it. It should be noted that, in these
debates, dignity is one component of a long-lasting and
widespread conceptual construct used to support a
stance on the ethical question of the moral status of an
action or being. This construct has been used from
Modernity onward to condemn slavery and torture
as violations of human dignity. In spelling it out,
we can come to a better understanding of what
“dignity” means and become aware that there
exists a quite useful place for this notion in our
ethical thought, albeit a modest one.
Keywords Dignity . Intrinsic value . Person .Moral
status . Slavery . Torture
Introduction
In recent decades, the invocation of human dignity has
become increasingly frequent in bioethical debates and
has also come under growing criticism. Some authors
deplore the degree to which it is now prevalent and fear
that it could become an irremediably confused concept.
Consequently, papers have appeared with denigrating
titles such as “Dignity Is a Useless Concept” (Macklin
2003) or even “The Stupidity of Dignity” (Pinker 2008),
while others have called for an “Undignified Bioethics”
(Cochrane 2010, 234)—that is, for a bioethics without
the language of dignity. If these views are correct, it
would be a big problem for all texts—moral and legal,
national and international—that place the concept of
human dignity at their center. However, to fully measure
the problem, the debate on the concept’s utility must be
supplemented by efforts toward a better understanding
of it. The present paper focuses mainly on this task. It is
not the first to tackle this issue. For instance, Rieke van
der Graaf and Johannes van Delden (2009) published a
paper on the history of dignity, with the aim of clarifying
the concept and justifying a moderate and reasonable
use of it in contemporary bioethics. This present paper
will focus more on the conceptual roots of dignity.
To understand adequately the conceptual structure of
“dignity” and its conceptual links to other important
notions of ethics (such as “intrinsic value,” “moral sta-
tus,” and “personhood”), it is nevertheless useful to
consider some historical aspects.1 This is the focus of
the first section. It will then be possible to gain a better
grasp of contemporary uses of “dignity” (second sec-
tion) and of the differences regarding the contexts of its
use in Europe and the United States (third section). In
the last section, I will examine the usefulness of the
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1 My aim is not to provide a thorough piece of historical analysis.
If some features of Kant’s and Aquinas’ conceptions are analyzed,
it is only because they are representative of the conceptual struc-
ture in which I am interested.
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concept and propose what I deem to be an appropriate
role for it in contemporary ethical debates.
Before addressing the subject of human dignity, it is
important to make some distinctions in order to avoid
misunderstandings. “Dignity” is restricted neither to
human dignity, nor to ethics. In everyday language, we
speak of dignity in the social domain (sometimes called
“dignity of merit”). In some languages, such as French
and German, “worthy” is translated by adjectives de-
rived from “dignity”: digne comes from dignité, würdig
fromWürde. In ethical matters, “dignity” (and “indigni-
ty”) is used in three different contexts, with three differ-
ent meanings. Dignity is sometimes linked to what we
do (we respect our own dignity when we act rightly, we
lose it when we act wrongly), sometimes to what we
suffer (when we are not treated as we deserve to be
treated, we can experience a feeling of indignity), and
sometimes to what we are.2 I am specifically concerned
with the third type of dignity. Because it is tied to what
we are—i.e., to our nature—it cannot be lost. Kant was
already aware of this when he stated: “I am not entitled
to refuse, even to the vicious, all consideration in his
capacity as a man, this last being inalienable, although
the other make himself unworthy of it,” because “hu-
manity is itself a dignity” (Kant 1886, 170–171).3 It is
important not to confuse the three meanings. For in-
stance, in the debate surrounding cloning, the claim that
this process goes against dignity is thought by some to
be problematic, because it implies in their minds that a
child procreated by cloning would be deprived of dig-
nity. This manner of thinking endures, argues Pinker
(2008, 5). Of course, the thesis that cloning is against
dignity is problematic, but not for the reason given by
those authors who confuse human dignity (that associ-
ated withwhat we are) with action dignity. Cloningmay
be or may not be a violation of human dignity through
action indignity, but it cannot destroy human dignity.
The same can be said for torture and all violations of
human dignity. What can be violated cannot be lost “as
long as the persons exist, even in case of extreme bodily
and cognitive deterioration,” add Chris Gastmans and
Jan De Lepeleire. Therefore, “loss of dignity cannot be
used as an argument for euthanasia in persons with severe
dementia” (Gastmans and De Lepeleire 2010, 84). Unfor-
tunately, this last claim equivocates: loss of human dignity
cannot, but loss of personal dignity could perhaps.
Roots and Conceptual Content
In this section, I will not dwell on the details of textual
interpretation. My aim is to shed light on conceptual
structures and contents that help us to understand the
current use of human dignity, because they have
remained rather constant for centuries and are typical
of a Western understanding of morality when it pertains
to the moral status of human beings. Sometimes, atten-
tion to detail can hinder us from seeing general
orientations. Moreover, I want to stress that the
conceptual structures analyzed here are not part
of the opposition between deontologists and
consequentialists, even if the former are more
prone to use the concept of human dignity.
When we ask: “Where does the concept of dignity
comes from?” philosophically minded people answer:
“From the philosophy of Kant.” It is true that the Ger-
man philosopher uses this concept frequently and that it
occupies a central place in his moral thought when he
addresses the question of what we now call “the moral
status” of human beings. It is well known that Kant
contrasts dignity with price:
“In the realm of ends everything has either a price
or an intrinsic value [Würde]. Anythingwith a price
can be replaced by something else as its equivalent,
whereas anything that is above all price and there-
fore admits of no equivalent has intrinsic value
(Kant 2008, 33, emphasis original).”
Bennett translates “dignity” by “intrinsic value,” be-
cause, as he says in a footnote: “At the end of the next
paragraph Kant explicitly equates those two meanings,
when he speaks of ‘intrinsic value’ (i.e. dignity) [einen
innern Wert, d.i. Würde]” (see Kant 2008, 33).4 For
morality and law, says Kant, there exists only two kinds
of beings—and consequently two kinds of moral sta-
tus—human beings (or persons) and things. Things can
be bought or sold, therefore they have a price and are
replaceable by other things of the same price; persons
2 See Baertschi (2005, 168–169). Lennart Nordenfelt (2004, 69)
has identified three kinds of dignity: dignity of moral stature,
dignity of identity, and human dignity (orMenschenwürde). How-
ever, I diverge somewhat from him on dignity of identity.
3 Aquinas, one of the first authors to make sense of the concept of
human dignity, claims that this dignity can be lost (1947, IIa–IIae,
q. 64, a. 2, ad 3).
4 Kant speaks of dignity as an internal value, but “internal” is
synonymous with “intrinsic.”
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cannot be bought or sold, therefore they have no price
and are not replaceable. They, and only they, have dignity.
By their nature, things are entities that can be
instrumentalized; persons should not, as the second for-
mula of the categorical imperative states: “Act in such a
way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or
in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely
as a means” (Kant 2008, 29). Persons should not be used
as mere means to an end, that is, instrumentalized.
People who are not philosophically minded generally
do not know the role of Kant, but do feel his influence:
The prohibition of instrumentalization is everywhere in
debates involving human dignity. Philosophically mind-
ed people are aware of this influence, but few of them
know that Kant’s concept of dignity has a long history. It
was already in force in the 13th century. We read in
Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences this passage:
“Dignity means the goodness something possesses be-
cause of itself, utility its goodness because of another”
[dignitas significat bonitatem alicujus propter seipsum,
utilitas vero propter aliud] (Aquinas 2012, lib. 3, d. 35,
q. 1, a. 4, q. 1, c). In contemporary words, dignity means
the intrinsic value of something, utility its instrumental
value. Kant agrees, but there is a big difference between
the two authors on this point: For Kant, dignity is a
property of beings, whereas for Aquinas, it is a property
of everything that possesses an intrinsic value. For the
latter, some activities possess such a value; to illustrate
the distinction, he mentions the greater dignity of con-
templation in comparison with active life.
Coupled with the metaphysical thesis that being and
goodness are coextensive, Aquinas’ position implies
that every being has a dignity and not only human
beings. He states this explicitly regarding beings that
are worthier (dignior) than human beings, angels, and
God: “The dignity of the divine nature exceeds every
other dignity” (Aquinas 1947, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, ad 2).
However, in principle, dignity could be attributed to
entities that are less worthy than human beings, such
as animals, because each nature possesses its own dig-
nity. Aquinas uses the expression dignior—“worthi-
er”—modeling a scale of beings in terms of value or
dignity. Kant is far from this metaphysical approach,
reserving dignity for human beings.
The formal conceptual content of dignity (dignity as
intrinsic value) is, nevertheless, constant from Aquinas to
Kant. This much is obvious from the texts and from their
opposition of dignity to utility and instrumentalization.
Indeed, the analogy goes deeper: For both authors,
dignity has the same place in the ethical landscape. Let
us consider this more precisely.
As we see from the writings of Aquinas and Kant,
dignity is rooted in intrinsic value in the sense that it is
intrinsic value. But from where does this value come?
The intrinsic value of an entity comes from its intrinsic
properties (because of itself, said Aquinas). With regard
to human dignity, the relevant intrinsic property is rea-
son in one form or another. Aquinas speaks generally of
“intellectual nature”: “The nature which person includes
in its definition is of all natures the most exalted [est
omnium naturarum dignissima], to wit that nature
which is intellectual in regard to its genus. Likewise
the mode of existence signified by the word person is
most exalted [dignissimus], namely that a thing exists by
itself” (Aquinas 1952, q. 9, a. 3, emphasis original).
Kant very often mentions autonomy, but self-
consciousness too, particularly in an illuminating passage:
The fact that man is aware of an ego-concept
raises him infinitely above all other creatures liv-
ing on earth. Because of this, he is a person.…He
is a being who, by reason of his preeminence and
dignity, is wholly different from things, such as
the irrational animals, which he can master and
rule at will (Kant 1978, 9).
As it appears in this last quotation, if reason is the
relevant property, it is because it is characteristic of hu-
man beings, as opposed to non-rational sensibility or
sentience, which is characteristic of animals.What counts
as dignity is, therefore, not any intrinsic property, but
intrinsic properties that are characteristic of beings, prop-
erties that belong to their essence. Sentience is an intrinsic
property of human beings, but not one that is character-
istic of human beings. Therefore it is not suitable for
human dignity. Recently, Rieke van der Graaf and
Johannes van Delden have stressed that human “dignity
is based on essential human characteristics” (Van der
Graaf and vanDelden 2009, 158), while AdamSchulman
links dignity with “the essential and inviolable core of our
humanity” (Schulman 2008, 17, emphasis original).5
Reason is the basis of dignity. If we tried to explain
more precisely their relation, we should say that dignity
5 One could object that “dignity” presupposes an essentialist con-
ception of human beings and that such a conception, like any
essentialism, is at best controversial. I agree that essentialist con-
ceptions are fraught with difficulties, but their discussion is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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supervenes on reason.6 However, human beings possess
several essential or distinctive intrinsic properties. Why
does reason hold such a privileged status? Aquinas and
Kant would give a different answer to this question,
because it is a metaphysical one and their metaphysics
differs widely. Yet what is common to them is the
widely shared thesis that rationality is what distin-
guishes human beings from animals.
Three more examples of this. The French poet Pierre
Ronsard writes in the 16th century that only reason sepa-
rates human beings and beasts and that reason is a faculty
lodged in the brain, having control over the body.7 One
century later, the philosopher Blaise Pascal states: “Man is
obviously made to think. It is his whole dignity and his
whole merit; and his whole duty is to think as he ought”
(Pascal 1660, 33).At the same time, Samuel vonPufendorf,
an author well acquainted with scholastic thought and who
has influenced Kant’s work, asserted that “the wordman is
thought to contain a certain dignity,” allowing us to respond
to someone disrespecting us thatwe aremen, not dogs (Von
Pufendorf 1964, 47, emphasis original).
Nowadays, this kind of anthropocentrism is often
doubted, because we have discovered that many rational
faculties are more or less present in some animals—but
our deep valuation of rationality has not vanished. It is
notably visible in our general stance toward the loss of
rational faculties: Such loss is generally considered the
worst thing that can affect us. For most of us, reason
remains internally linked with high value, in such a way
that we seldom ask for a justification of this link. It is a
kind of moral intuition.
Amongst the intrinsic properties that characterize
human beings, reason is the basis of dignity, say
Aquinas, Kant, and the tradition they exemplify. To be
precise, reason is not conceived as a characteristic of a
human being, but of a person. Western philosophers
from Boethius onwards have proposed that a person is
an individual endowed with reason.8 Aquinas and Kant
tie personhood to dignity and to reason. Aquinas states:
In a more special and perfect way, the particular and
the individual are found in the rational substances
which have dominion over their own actions; and
which are not only made to act, like others; but
which can act of themselves.… Therefore also the
individuals of the rational nature have a special
name even among other substances; and this name
is “person” (1947, Ia, q. 29, a. 1).
Nowadays, authors such as Tristram Engelhardt em-
phasize the same conceptual structure, even if he does not
use the concept of dignity in this context: “What distin-
guishes persons is their capacity to be self-conscious,
rational, and concerned with worthiness of blame and
praise. The possibility of such entities grounds the possi-
bility of the moral community” (Engelhardt 1986, 107).
He is not alone in this way of thinking. TheUniversal
Declaration of Human Rights also links human dignity
to reason, but there is an ambiguous understanding of
“person” and “human being,” as we read in Article 1:
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights. They are endowed with reason and con-
science.” Strictly speaking, this is false: Every human
being is not endowed with reason and conscience, even
if we understand reason as a potentiality (think of anen-
cephalic babies). Contrariwise, it is by definition true that
every person is endowed with reason and conscience. This
ambiguity is rather widespread; even Kant speaks some-
times of “personhood,” sometimes of “humanity.” It is the
source of many problems, particularly the question of the
moral status of so-called marginal human beings, i.e. hu-
man beingswho are not persons in the sense defined above
(embryos, anencephalic babies, PVS patients, etc.).
We can now summarize the formal structure we have
highlighted in the following manner: Person is the name
of a moral status. What is distinctive about this status is
the possession of reason, an intrinsic property that gives
its bearer an intrinsic value or dignity.
Some remarks are still in order.
First, from Kant onwards, the tendency has been to
reserve dignity exclusively for human beings. Earlier,
this was not the case: As we have seen, Aquinas extends
dignity—and personhood—to angels and God. Dignity,
however, was not attributed to non-rational beings, even
if its definition could have allowed it, since intrinsic
value is not exemplified in rationality alone. As Lennart
Nordenfelt states, there is of course a good conceptual
reason not to attribute dignity to lower beings: “Dignity
refers to a special dimension of value” (2004, 70). That
is, to a high place on the scale of values, a scale where
human beings have traditionally occupied the highest
6 This thesis has been defended by G.E. Moore. See Rabinowicz
and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000; Baertschi 2012.
7 “Ce qui fait différer l’homme d’avec la bête—Ce n’est pas
l’estomac ni le pied ni la tête—La face ni les yeux; c’est la seule
raison” (Ronsard 1989, 236).
8 A third founding father of Western ethics, John Locke, is of the
same mind (Locke 1690, 540).
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place in the realm of natural beings. If we abandon this
anthropocentrist view, which is an increasingly common
position to adopt, dignity could be attributed to beings
we value, such as apes, whales, or even native forests.
As we will see later, the Swiss Constitution exemplifies
this trend.
Second, the fact that dignity refers to intrinsic value
and is attributed to non-human beings (i.e., super-human
ones) clearly shows that, in our moral tradition, “person”
and not “human being” is the right designation for the
relevant moral status of beings like us. More precisely,
“human being” is not the name of a moral status. It is
important to emphasize this point, because some authors—
notably Leon Kass—have used the concept of dignity
to oppose the personhood account, which deprives mar-
ginal humans of full moral status (Ashcroft 2005). As
Kass says: “The account of human dignity we badly
need in bioethics goes beyond the said dignity of ‘per-
sons’ to embrace the worthiness of embodied human
life” (Kass 2008, 313). Many international declarations
on dignity also focus on humanity rather than person-
hood (Cutas 2005). What Kass and others say may be
right, but it is not in keeping with the traditional concept
of dignity. An alternative position, which claims that
“[t]he dignity of ‘being a person’ should not depend on
whether one has or does not have certain capacities (e.g.
intellectual capacities)” (Gastmans and De Lepeleire
2010, 81), does not correspond with the dignity tradition
either. Conversely, the conceptions of the deontologist
Tristram Engelhardt and of the utilitarian Peter
Singer are in tune with the traditional concept of
dignity, even if they insist on personhood rather
than dignity.
Third, many contemporary authors assert that human
dignity is rooted in the belief that human beings have
been created in God’s image (Kraynak 2008). Even if
such an idea is easily derived from the concept of
person, since a human person is endowed with the same
reason as God, the conceptual structure I have
underlined is independent of any religious thesis. As
we shall see later, it is also independent of any conser-
vative thesis.
Fourth, the conceptual status of “person” is not clear.
For Engelhardt and most personists, being a person is an
individual predicate. An individual is a person if and
only if he or she—as an individual—possesses rational
powers. For other authors, being a person is a natural
kind predicate. Therefore, an individual is a person if
and only if he or she belongs to a kind whose standard
members possess rational powers. Daniel Sulmasy de-
fends such a theory when he argues: “It is not the
expression of rationality that makes us human, but our
belonging to a kind that is capable of rationality that
makes us human” (Sulmasy 2008 478). Kant was very
probably an individualist, but it is not clear whether
Aquinas was. Notice that a natural kind conception
allows us to avoid the marginal human beings’ problem,
but at a very high price for many individualists, since it
places high barriers in the way of abortion or embryo
research, for example.9
Last, a metaethical remark. The conceptual structure
does not have any privileged relationship with moral
realism. It states that intrinsic value supervenes from
intrinsic properties, but remains silent on the nature of
this relationship. It can be read in a realist spirit, but in an
antirealist spirit too, if, for instance, we understand it in
the following manner: The intrinsic value of x is
projected on x on the basis of its intrinsic properties.
Current Ethical Content
The conceptual content of dignity has been held con-
stant for a long time, and the conceptual structure it
weaves with moral status, personhood, and reason has
also remained essentially the same throughout the cen-
turies. The first challenge to this structure was the birth
of utilitarianism and its objections against the weight
and the value of reason in ethics. In terms of the formal
structure itself, however, the challenge has not been
crucial: For the Benthamists, sentience simply replaced
reason as the distinctive property of moral status, and
other utilitarians have not abandoned the concept of
person. Further dissent between moral philosophers
concerns the opposition we find between monists and
pluralists. I use these terms with the following meaning:
A monistic conception of moral status argues that there
exists only one moral status (either you have a moral
status or you have no moral status); utilitarians and Kant
are monists. In comparison, a pluralistic conception
states that there exist several kinds of moral status,
depending on different properties; for example, reason
for persons, sentience for animals, life for plants. Nev-
ertheless, for both sides of this debate, the formal struc-
ture remains the same.
9 I have discussed elsewhere the question of the embryo’s moral
status in an individualist spirit (Baertschi and Mauron 2010).
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Historically, the first full occurrence of this construct
of which I am aware is Aquinas’ view, but parts of it are
found much earlier. The contrast between human beings
and animals understood as a contrast between reason and
sentience (affective life) is well articulated in Aristotle’s
philosophy. We also find a moral consideration against
bestiality in the name of human dignity in Cicero’s texts:
One’s physical comforts and wants should be
ordered according to the demands of health and
strength, not according to the calls of pleasure.
And if we will only bear in mind the superiority
and dignity of our nature, we shall realize how
wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to
live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right
it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and
sobriety. … [We are] all alike endowed with rea-
son and with that superiority which lifts us above
the brute (Cicero 1913, 109).
This view persisted in the middle ages (Dale 1977)
and beyond, as we have seen with Ronsard, Pascal,
Pufendorf, and Kant.
I have argued that this conceptual structure is still
with us. But what about its ethical content? From the
time of Aquinas, the moral landscape has changed.
Questions pertaining to the good life of the agent (the
person) have largely been replaced by questions
concerning right actions toward other persons. Never-
theless, questions related to moral status and dignity
remain. The moral status of an entity implies how we
ought to treat it. As Mary Anne Warren stated: “If an
entity has moral status, then we may not treat it in just
any way we please” (Warren 1997, 3). In Aquinas’ time,
this demand was spelled out in a theory of the various
virtues we should cultivate, so there is an inescapable
reference to duties toward oneself in this approach to
morality (hence the condemnation of bestiality). Inmod-
ern times, this reference has been largely downplayed in
favor of duties toward other persons.
Injunctions to respect dignity have thus taken an
impersonal or an other-directed turn. In Kant’s writings,
we observe the two trends, with a stress on duties toward
oneself: “Ethics gives no title to vice on account of its
harmlessness; for the dishonour (i.e., to be an object of
ethical disdain) it entails, accompanies the liar like his
shadow.…A lie is the abandonment, and, as it were, the
annihilation, of the dignity of a man” (Kant 1978, 148).
In a contemporary context, liars are not condemned in
thismanner, but the question of respecting dignity in oneself
has not totally disappeared, even if it is contested (Cutas
2005). In our liberal tradition, however, dignity is mainly
concernedwithwhat we ought to do to other human beings.
What then does it now mean to respect human dig-
nity? The answer is usually expressed in two bans: a ban
on instrumentalization and a ban on degrading treat-
ments or humiliations.
These two bans are conspicuous in internationally
important texts. For example, in the preamble of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Appli-
cation of Biology and Medicine (Oviedo Convention),
we read that the European Council is “conscious that the
misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endan-
gering human dignity,” in the sense that biotechnologies
could treat human beings in a manner not appropriate
for the being they are. In the Universal Declaration on
the Human Genome and Human Rights proclaimed by
UNESCO, we find the same lesson, for example, in
Article 2: “Dignity makes it imperative not to reduce
individuals to their genetic characteristics and to respect
their uniqueness and diversity.” Medicine and biology
could reduce human beings to the status of objects for
experiment or could consider them as completely deter-
mined by their genome, thus treating them as non-
persons (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2002).
The ban on instrumentalization is the most voiced of
the two bans. As we know, it appeared in Kant’s second
formulation of the categorical imperative. However, it is
in one sense less fundamental than the ban on degrading
treatments, because instrumentalization is only one kind
of degrading treatment: It degrades a human being to the
status of a thing. Nevertheless, if the two bans are kept
separate, it is because each points to a different para-
digm: The paradigm of instrumentalization is slavery,
whereas the paradigm of degrading treatment is torture.
Notice that if torture is such a paradigm, it is not because
of the pain inflicted but because pain has the effect of
inducing emotions and behaviors that are in contradic-
tion to what the victim wants to feel and to be as a free
and rational person. Historically, slavery and torture are
perhaps the two main domains where human beings
have been (and unfortunately still are) treated with total
disrespect. Thus, it is not surprising that they are men-
tioned so often in international legal texts.
Torture is clearly bad; instrumentalization is bad, too,
but is often much more difficult to detect, which is
probably why it has attracted more attention. A reinforc-
ing factor is that instrumentalization has an internal link
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with liberty or autonomy, a rational property of human
beings that is so important for contemporary ethics. The
link can be articulated in seven propositions:
1. A person is a rational being.
2. Rationality includes the freedom and power to con-
duct one’s life; i.e., to determine one’s goals
(autonomy).
3. A behavior that does not respect a person’s autono-
my does not respect that person.
4. When we instrumentalize a person, we substitute or
impose our own goals.
5. Therefore, instrumentalization amounts to a lack of
respect for a person.
6. To have no respect for someone as a person amounts
to a violation of dignity.
7. Therefore, to instrumentalize a person amounts to a
violation of his or her dignity.
This argument shows clearly that contemporary uses
of dignity are rooted in its traditional meaning: To
instrumentalize or degrade a human being manifests a
lack of respect for that being; i.e., for his or her intrinsic
value. It amounts to treating an individual like—literal-
ly—an Untermensch. Another striking illustration that
the contemporary use of dignity is rooted in its tradition-
al meaning is UNESCO’s Bioethics Core Curriculum,
where we read that human dignity is “an intrinsic value
of the person capable (at least potentially or as a member
of natural kind) of reflection, sensitivity, verbal commu-
nication, free choice, self-determination in conduct and
creativity” (UNESCO 2008, 19, emphasis added).
Notice that this seven-steps argument should be
made more specific in order to answer some objections.
Remembering Kant, we could highlight that a liar vio-
lates not only his or her own dignity but also the dignity
of his or her victim, since in lying he or she manipulates
his or her victims and, in a certain sense, imposes his or
her own goals on the victim.10 However, to repeat a
well-known argument, we have a duty to lie to a Nazi
who is looking for a resistance fighter hiding in our
cellar. Does it mean that we have a duty to violate the
Nazi’s dignity? Kant answered negatively: We never
have a duty to lie, because we always ought to act under
the supposition that the person in front of us will behave
morally. However, (almost) nobody follows him in his
opinion, because we usually think that it is not morally
responsible to act as if evil persons did not exist. How
then to answer the question? Several paths can be con-
templated, but in my mind the most promising is to
consider that imposing foreign goals on a person does
not consist in a violation of his or her dignity when his or
her own goals are not rationally pursued or morally
permissible. Otherwise, punishment and even education
would consist in violations of human dignity.
Contemporary Contexts of Use
Understood in this way, dignity seems to be quite an
honorable concept. Why, then, all this fuss about it? In
my opinion, it comes primarily from some of its uses. But
the contexts in which dignity is now referred are manifold
and do not necessarily pose any special problem.
First, as already mentioned, there is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1949. The previous
declaration of 1789 did not mention dignity, but only the
equality of rights. Several international texts refer ex-
plicitly to that Universal Declaration, especially in the
domain of biotechnology. National legal texts mention
dignity, some in their constitution (especially Germany
and Switzerland) and others in various legal documents
(for example, France and Sweden). This use, inspired by
the Universal Declaration, is neutral in the sense that it
does not correspond to any partisan doctrine: It is not
conservative or progressive, rightist or leftist, religious
or secular, even if it suffers from the ambiguity between
person and human being. As a legal concept, it has no
specific content: As several constitutionalists have em-
phasized, its content is provided by different fundamen-
tal rights, especially autonomy and personal liberty. In
Switzerland, for example, lawyers believe that human
dignity is directly tied to personal liberty, that it is an
objective principle that must be protected and respected
in the whole of the legal order but which cannot be
called upon unless liberty or another fundamental right
is in jeopardy (Auer, Malinverni, and Hottelier, 2000).11
Even so, for most lawyers it is not a “useless concept”
because it signifies a commitment to the particular value
of human beings. As Roberto Andorno notes:
It is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to provide a
justification of human rights without making some
10 I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.
11 For Germany, another country that gives a prominent place to
dignity in its Constitution, see Weithman (2008).
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reference, at least implicitly, to the idea of human
dignity. This notion is usually associated with su-
preme importance, fundamental value and inviola-
bility of the human person (Andorno 2002, 960).
If this first use is widespread in Europe, a second is
characteristic of many debates in the United States. Here,
dignity is a partisan concept, claimed by conservatives.
Dignity underwent a renewal of fame when Leon Kass
was president of the Council on Bioethics, and it now
flourishes in American conservative circles. It is against
this use that Steven Pinker has spoken of the stupidity of
dignity. The problem with the conservative use is, as Ruth
Macklin states, that “appeals to dignity continue to abound
… without any attempt to define or analyze the concept”
(Macklin 2006, 37), as if dignity were a primitive concept,
a verbal expression for the perception of an unanalyzable
value. Kass, however, goes into some detail. He takes on
the formal and traditional content of dignity when he
speaks of “the dignity or worth or standing of the human
creature” that “reveals that elusive core of our humanity,
those special qualities that makes us more than
beasts yet less than gods” (2005, 240). He also
puts substantial content in it by providing a list of
goods relevant to dignity. Unfortunately, what is
lacking is a justification of the inclusion of the
items in the list, something that actually belongs to
the core of the bioethicist’s task and is necessary.
This debate is not absent in Europe: The Catholic
Church and fundamentalist Protestant circles have
objected to artificial procreation and to experimentation
on embryos—and even to biotechnology in general—in
the name of human dignity. But they are not alone, and
we do not observe a left–right divide on these topics.
The debate surrounding euthanasia and assisted suicide
has produced a third context of the concept’s use (though it
may have been the first chronologically). Both sides have
asked for a dignified death—i.e., a death in conformity
with our humanity (or our status as persons). However,
dignity has received two different contents in this debate,
depending on the side embraced by the user.
Finally, recent debates in some European countries
have demonstrated a tendency to extend the scope of
dignity to non-human animals (and even to all living
things, as in the Swiss Constitution). This extension is in
agreement with the conceptual content of dignity (if
non-human beings have an intrinsic value, then they
have dignity) and could be in tune with our contempo-
rary sensibility to values, but is rather difficult to
articulate with human dignity because human dignity
is indicative of rights, whose attribution to non-human
beings is problematic. In Switzerland, the solution has
been to equate respect for the dignity of non-human
beings, particularly animals, with taking their interests
seriously, for those who have interests. In short: Put all
the existing interests in a balance and decide in favor of
the most dominant (ECNH and FCAE 2001).
The Abuse of Dignity?
Dignity is a concept that is used in a great diversity of
contexts, and in each context, appeals to human dignity
abound; their frequency is manifestly increasing. Is it
justified? In this last section, I will try to answer this
question, asking first if we could dispense with the
concept and second if we should dispense with it.
Could we dispense with the concept of “dignity”?
Obviously, we could. Since “dignity” is synonymous
with “intrinsic value,” we could simply replace the first
expression by the second. Macklin makes another prop-
osition, to speak of autonomy instead of dignity. But this
proposition could be accepted only if respecting the
intrinsic value of persons is equivalent to respecting
their autonomy. If this were the case, then voluntary
slavery or dire poverty would not per se constitute
infringements of human dignity, a conclusion that only
some libertarians would endorse. Perhaps, therefore, we
could supplement autonomy with basic rights. This will
satisfy liberals and, probably, most jurists. Of course,
conservatives and perfectionists, that is people who
think that respect for the human person is not exhausted
by respect for individual rights, will not agree.
There is another problem with this strategy of re-
placement: It is no less efficacious against rights than
it is against dignity. We could (and should) dispense
with rights, say some authors. Bentham and Marx are
two defenders of this position. Actually, from a concep-
tual point of view, the argument against dignity can be
used against rights. In principle, rights could be dis-
pensed with and replaced by concepts such as “happi-
ness,” “good,” or “value.” Thus, the ethical work can be
done without rights, which would possess only rhetori-
cal force (Baertschi 2008). However, this critique, valid
as it is, is not necessarily fatal. Concerning rights, Loren
Lomasky concedes the conceptual point. But for him
rights are, nevertheless, important for our morality, since
rhetoric is the art of putting something—here, certain
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values—in a prominent place: “The very vigor and
insistence of rights advocates may lead us to conjecture
that the language of right has an importance which
would not survive a shift of idiom” (Lomasky 1987,
10). Could the same claim be made for dignity?12
This question leads us to another (the second part of
our issue): Should we dispense with the concept of
“dignity”? The answer is affirmative only if we cannot
give an answer in Lomansky’s guise. In other words, can
we propose an argument in favor of dignity that is
similar to that in favor of rights? If not, dignity will be
a useless concept; if so, it will be a useful one. In my
opinion, we are in possession of such an argument:
Dignity is useful in order to cast a full light on certain
practices that we do not want established—or re-
established, for instance practices resembling slavery and
torture. It is in order to denounce such degrading treat-
ments that, in modern and contemporary times, we appeal
to human dignity, because we think that it is insufficient to
invoke rights or the mere intrinsic value of human beings.
In this context, it is morally necessary to use another
word—even a traditional one—because of the importance
of the values placed in jeopardy and of themoral agenda of
what we hope will lead to moral progress. Therefore, it is
not justified to speak of the “stupidity of dignity.” Pinker
would agree with much of this, since he claims:
Dignity is a phenomenon of human perception.…
Certain features in another human being trigger
ascriptions of worth. … The perception of dignity
in turn elicits a response in the perceiver. … The
appearance of dignity triggers a desire to esteem
and respect the dignified person. This explains why
dignity is morally significant: We should not ignore
a phenomenon that causes one person to respect the
rights and interests of another (2008, 7).
However, to extend the application of dignity, as
conservatives do, is to diminish its strength and to lose
the widespread consensus respect for dignity possesses
in the context of degrading treatments. Sometimes, dig-
nity is even invoked in bioethical debates to conceal a
bad argument or the absence of an argument. Unfortu-
nately, this is not the only term used when the parties are
short of rational considerations; think of expressions
such as “But this is against human rights!” or “But that
is eugenics!” Like dignity, human rights and eugenics
are very often used in bad rhetoric.
Bad rhetoric apart, we can nevertheless understand
why “dignity” can be rather easily extended. There is a
conceptual reason we already know: In itself, dignity is
simply a name for the intrinsic value of a being, and its
meaning can only be determined by the conception we
entertain of the nature of this being (i.e., its main valu-
able characteristics). If we entertain a perfectionist and
rich notion of these characteristics, if we have a thick
conception of the good life for a person, dignity could be
put forward in opposition to an intervention that has
received informed consent and does no wrong to any
third party. In this sense, Pinker is right when he states:
“The concept of dignity is natural ground on which to
build an obstructionist bioethics” (2008, ¶18). The ap-
peal to dignity is, then, only a way to oppose a liberal
stance; it does not justify anything by itself.
The content of “dignity” must be determined and is
determinable only by valuable features of the person,
features that now as before refer to an aspect of ratio-
nality. We can fill it with a conservative conception, but
there is nothing necessary in this respect. It is also
possible to fill it with liberal content, even with libertar-
ian content; for instance, by adopting a conception of
dignity grounded in the notion of autonomy.
A person is distinctive because of certain rational
properties. Let us accept as a possible interpretation of
this thesis that autonomy—the capacity to direct one’s
life—is one of these relevant capacities, even the most
important. It would follow that human dignity is
grounded in the capacity for autonomy.13 From this
point of view, it would not be possible to appeal to
human dignity to obstruct a procedure that has received
informed consent and does no wrong to anybody else.
Such an obstruction would disrespect dignity. As Adam
Schulman asks:
If the rational will alone is the seat of human
dignity, why should it matter if we are born of
cloned embryos, or if we enhance our muscles and
control our moods with drugs, or if we sell our
organs on the open market? (2008, 11).
12 The use of the expression “rhetoric” here should not be
misinterpreted. It does not amount to the derogatory thesis that
talk of dignity or rights would only be rhetoric (and not ethics). In
using this expression, I intend to stress the function of rhetoric in
our moral and social life—a very important function indeed.
13 Significantly, this conception would even be more germane to
tradition than the conservative one, as the latter supplements the
concept of a person with non-rational elements (Kass 2005).
Bioethical Inquiry (2014) 11:201–211 209
We could even extend such a conception to
transhumanism: In voluntarily “rectifying the flaws
in our design” (Rubin 2008, 157), we complete
and supplement our nature with a beneficial use
of our rational powers.
Violations of dignity are always a debasement of
moral status, but there are several ways of understanding
this depending on how one conceives what is appropri-
ate for a being with the status of a person. In terms of
liberal thought, instrumentalization is an example of
such debasement; for perfectionists, the list is much
longer. But is it not an open moral question to determine
if everything freely consented to is by that fact morally
good or permissible or praiseworthy? To condemn the
use of dignity as a stupidity should not be used as
another rhetorical weapon, even in favor of the liberal
side of the debate. Liberals and conservatives ought to
offer arguments.
All these uses and abuses are made possible because
“dignity”—like “person,” “moral status,” and “intrinsic
value”—has little substantial content in itself. It is a kind
of thin evaluative term, and as such, it becomes easily
pluralistic when it is given more content. Different con-
ceptions of what a human being is and of its intrinsic
value (i.e., of its dignity) are at play and in opposition,
each with its own moral demands. As Schulman states:
“A variety of strong convictions can be derived from
powerful but conflicting intuitions about what human
dignity demands of us” (2008, 5).
Debates must acknowledge this and build arguments
for and against these conceptions, without waving “flag
words” like “dignity” or “stupidity.” Therefore, the
question asked by Alasdair Cochrane is appropriate:
“The dignity of human beings tells us that we have
certain important obligations towards them. But which
obligations?” (2010, 4). It would nevertheless be a mis-
take to believe that the task of answering this question
should fall on the concept of dignity. To be sure, if this
concept is thin, it is not hollow. Yet the most it can tell us
is that it grounds obligations we have toward beings
possessing rational capacities because of these capaci-
ties, forbidding us from treating them like non-rational
beings: that is, without respecting their own true goals.
Conclusion
Dignity is a very old concept, but its uses in bioethical
debates are rather new. It has rapidly acquired a
rhetorical overtone, especially for authors who do not
think that considerations of rights exhaust the ethical
debate, like various perfectionists such as conservatives
and religious thinkers. It is, however, quite possible to
use it in a liberal spirit or, more broadly, in a spirit that
places autonomy and liberty at the fore. I have tried to
show that this concept, if used in conformity with its
traditional formal meaning, as synonymous with intrin-
sic value and as an indicator of the importance of the
moral status of personhood, does not constitute a prob-
lem and cannot be hijacked by a party.
Of course, it is possible that, in the future and con-
trary to our moral tradition, dignity and personhood will
separate and the debates surrounding dignity will be
defined along the lines of Pinker’s critique. This may
be the case if the American controversy prevails and will
represent bad news for bioethics. In my opinion, the best
way to prevent such an issue from arising is to restrict
the concept of dignity to its traditional and consensual
use. In other words, that human beings or persons pos-
sess an intrinsic value that demands to be respected in
the context of condemnation of degrading practices
resembling slavery and torture; dignity ought to be used
“as a placeholder against great evils” (Neuhaus 2008,
218). To do that, the language of rights appears to be a
little too lightweight.
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